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COMMENTS
Surrogate Parenting: Future Legislation to Eliminate
Present Inconsistencies
Now Sarai, Abram's wife, had borne him no children. And she had
an Egyptian maidservant whose name was Hagar. So Sarai said to
Abram, 'See now, the LORD has restrained me from bearing children.
Please, go in to my maid; perhaps I shall obtain children by her.'
And Abram heeded the voice of Sarai. Then Sarai, Abram's wife took
Hagar her maid, the Egyptian, and gave her to her husband Abram
to be his wife ....

So he went in to Hagar, and she conceived....

So Hagar bore Abram a son; and Abram named his son, whom Hagar
bore, Ishmael.I
The concept of surrogate motherhood is not new. It only recently
has emerged as a serious and commonly discussed option for childless
couples who are unable to have children and unable or unwilling to
adopt. As more people consider the possibility of surrogate motherhood, or surrogate parenting, the courts and legislatures increasingly will be asked to find answers to novel legal, ethical, and public
policy questions and to decide if, and under what circumstances, it
2
should be accepted and legalized.
Our present legal system has not adequately addressed the problems
inherent in surrogate motherhood. Legislation which regulates the
practice is virtually nonexistent. By reason of the lack of surrogate
parenting legislation, and the uncertain applicability of existing legislation, the enforceability of a surrogate parenting agreement or
contract is unpredictable. As it stands presently, the children born
through surrogate parenting agreements are being born into a "legal
vacuum." 3
1. Genesis, 16: 1-4, 15 (New King James Version). But see Krimmel, The
Case Against Surrogate Parenting, 3 Hastings Center Rep. 35, 36 1983 stating that
Sarai actually had given Hagar to Abram as a second wife and that Hagar did not
relinquish Ishmael to Sarai; rather, after Sarai gave birth to Isaac, she banished
both Hagar and Ishmael.
2. Bird, Surrogate Motherhood: Hers? Yours? Ours?, 2 CALi. LAWYER 21
(1982).
3. Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REv. 597, 664 (1986).
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The purpose of this comment is to highlight the concerns which
legislators must confront when proposing legislation for the regulation
of surrogate mothering. By placing emphasis on the few court cases
to date concerning surrogate mothering, this comment advocates the
adoption of legislation designed specifically to govern the enforceability of surrogate parenting agreements. It is only through such
legislation that the numerous legal and ethical questions can be finally
answered. Unless legislatures familiarize themselves with the potential
consequences of surrogate motherhood, and adopt precise legislation
outling the rights and obligations of all the parties involved, "a
'4
chaotic patchwork of judicial decisions will result."
In order to fully comprehend the necessity of legislation, it must
first be understood exactly what surrogate motherhood entails. A
"surrogate" is defined as a person who functions in another's life
as a substitute for some third person.' The term "mother", when
used as a verb, includes the meaning "to give birth to." '6 Hence, the

term 'surrogate mother' is a woman appointed to give birth to a
child in the place of another." 7 Stated simply, "surrogate mothering"
is a procedure by which a woman produces a child for a couple or
a single person by becoming impregnated, carrying the fetus to term,
and then surrendering her parental rights to enable the adoption of
8
the child.
Surrogate mothering is classified into three distinct types. 9 The first
method, which is the most prevalent, employs the process of artificial
insemination. 0 Under this method, the surrogate mother is artificially
inseminated with sperm from the husband of the adopting couple."

4.

Comment, Surrogate Mothering: Medical Reality in a Legal Vacuum, 8

J. LEG. 140 (1981).
5. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1370 (23rd ed. 1976). A surrogate is

likewise defined as a person who reminds one of another person so that one uses
the first as an emotional substitute for the second. Id.
6.

WEBSTER's TsIm

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1474 (1981).

7. Special Project, 39 VAND. L. REv. at 632.
8. See Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALI. L. REv. 611 (1978)
(contract analysis applied to surrogate motherhood); Comment, Parenthood by
Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IowA L. REv. 385 (1982) (family
law approach to surrogate mothering).
9. Special Project, 39 VAND. L. REv. at 632.

10. Id. Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen into the vagina
or uterus by means of a syringe or other instrument. Id. at 632 n.172.
11.

Id. at 632. This type of surrogate mothering is usually used when the

wife of the adopting couple has some reproductive incapacity which prevents her
from bearing children. Id. If the semen is obtained from the husband, it is
homologous artificial insemination; if the semen is obtained from another male, it
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Thereafter, the surrogate carries the child to term and agrees to
2
terminate all parental rights upon birth.'
The second type of surrogate parenting is known as in vitro
fertilization. 3 Under this method, the adopting couple supplies a
doctor with both semen and an egg and the doctor fertilizes the egg
by in vitro fertilization. 14 After the fertilized egg is implanted in the
surrogate, the process is the same as in the first method. 5 The third
and final method of surrogate motherhood is a modification of the
in vitro fertilization method. 6 The process is almost identical to the
previous method, however, instead of giving the child to the couple
who donated the sperm and the egg, the surrogate mother surrenders
17
the child to another couple.
Although the three methods of surrogate mothering involve different medical processes, the legal ramifications of each are strikingly
similar. 8 Therefore, the remainder of this comment will focus on
the first type of surrogate mothering, that is, surrogate mothering
through artificial insemination.
I.

CONSTITUTUIONAL LIMITATIONS

Before enacting legislation to clarify the rights and obligations of
all the parties involved in a surrogate mothering agreement, the

is heterologous artificial insemination. See 1 SCMIMDT'S ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE A-306 (1968). A variation of this method, known as confused or combined
artificial insemination, is accomplished by taking the semen of the adopting father
and combining it with semen from an unknown donor. 39 VAND. L. REV. at 633
n.173.
12. 39 VAND. L. REv. at 632-33.
13. Id. at 633. This type may be used either when the wife suffers from an
abnormality which prevents her egg from being fertilized or when she is unable to
carry the child to term due to some abnormality in her uterus. Id. Under this
process, the ovum may be fertilized during normal sexual intercourse or by artificial
insemination and then transplanted to the surrogate mother. Otherwise, the ovum
must be fertilized in vitro and then transplanted to the surrogate mother. See 8 J.
LEG. at 142 n.15.
14. 39 VAND. L. REV. at 633.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Under these circumstances, the child would technically have five
parents: the egg donor, the sperm donor, the surrogate mother, and the adopting
couple. Id. at 633 n.176 (citing, Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of
the New Reproductive Technologies, 6 WHITTIER L., Rv. 789, 791 (1984)). This
method would most likely be employed by a couple' when both the husband and
wife were infertile. 39 VAMD. L. REV. at 634.
18. 39 VAND. L. REv. at 634.

636
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legislature must consider the constitutional limits on its power. A
constitutionally based right of privacy was first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.19 Though
the Supreme Court failed to define the extent of this zone of privacy,
it was held to extend at least to the intimate decisions regarding

child-rearing

20

The boundaries of the right to privacy remain uncertain even
today. The United States Supreme Court has recognized, however,
that the right of a woman to decide whether or not to have children
is a fundamental personal right protected by the United States
Constitution. 21 "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
22
person as his decision whether to bear or beget a child."
In order to determine the constitutionality of surrogate mothering,
it must first be determined whether surrogate mothering involves a

19.

381 U.S. 479 (1965). The United States Supreme Court found that a

Connecticut statute, making the use of contraceptives a criminal offense, was
unconstitutional as it violated the right of marital privacy which is within the
penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 485-86. It must be
recognized that the decision in Griswold emphasizes the right of marital privacy.
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Id. at 485-86 (emphasis added).
20.
21.

Id. at 485.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although the Constitution does not

explicitly mention any right of privacy, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that a "right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152. Only personal
rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. Id. (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)). The United States Supreme Court noted that the
right of privacy extends to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); contraception,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
22. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot
be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.
Id. at 453.
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fundamental right.23 Although it appears that a surrogate mother's
decision to become pregnant parallels the fundamental right of reproductive privacy, the adopting couple's claimed right of reproductive privacy does not appear to be sufficiently similar. As recognized
in Eisenstadt v. Baird,24 the emphasis in reproductive capacity is on
the right of the individual to control his or her own reproductive
faculties. 25 Giving the adopting couple a right to control the surro26
gate's reproductive faculties would, therefore, be contradictory.
Hence, since the adopting couple has no fundamental right to employ
a surrogate mother, the legislature may constitutionally regulate the
activities between the parties.
II.

INAPPLICABILITY OF EXISTING STATE STATUTES

Before a state may propose legislation specifically designed to
regulate surrogate motherhood, it must first be determined whether
or not existing state statutes are applicable. Often states have statutes
which, on their face, appear to be applicable to the surrogate
motherhood arrangements. 27 However, because most of these statutes
were enacted before surrogate motherhood became a viable option,
the states must examine the goals and purposes underlying the statutes
to determine whether they are applicable.2"
Virtually all states have enacted statutes that bar or restrict fetal
experimentation. 29 Though fetal experimentation statutes may be applicable to in vitro fertilization, because conception takes place
outside of the womb, they would not be applicable to the traditional
artificial insemination method. 0 Considering that the purpose of fetal
experimentation statutes is to prevent cruelty and harm to unborn
fetuses, it is clear that they should not apply to surrogate mothering

23. Fundamental rights are those rooted in the express guarantees of the
Constitution and in the implied guarantees that flow from them. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484.
24. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25. Id.at 453.

26.
27.

28.

Comment, 8 J. LEG. at 158.
See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
39 VAID. L. REV. at 639. Statutes which appear to be applicble include

those regulating fetal experimentation, and statutes prohibiting a mother from
receiving compensation for placing a child up for adoption. Id. at 639 n.187.
29. Id.at 643. See also Comment, Surrogate Mother: The Legal Issues, 7
AM. J. LAW & MED. 323, 328 (1981). For a comprehensive review, see Flannery,
Weisman, Lipsett & Bravermena, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro
Fertilization, 67 GEO. L.J. 1295, 1299-1300 (1979).

30.

39

VAND.

L.

REV.

at 643-44.
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agreements. "The surrogate parenting process, rather than harming
3
fetuses, promotes the health and safety of the fetus." '
A more troublesome analysis arises from a group of various state
statutes dealing with the adoption and custody of children. Many
state statutes prohibit a mother from receiving compensation for
permitting another person to adopt her child. 2 In eight other states,
payment to a mother to surrender a child for any purpose is prohib-

ited. 31 Still other states prohibit any unlicensed agency or person

from receiving compensation for placing a child up for adoption.

4

31. Id.
32. Id. at 639. Cf., e.g., AmIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114 (Supp. 1985) (stating
that spouse of natural parent is exempt from prohibition, and that a mother can
receive medical and legal expenses if they are approved by the court); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13 § 928(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(l)(d) (West 1985) (indicating
that the mother can receive actual medical, hospital, confinement and living expenses); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511-1512 (1979) (allowing mother to receive payment of
medical bills); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985) (allowing payment and
receipt of attorney's fees, medical expenses, reasonable charges by a licensed agency,
and other court-approved charges); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West 1981) (allowing
receipt of actual expenses); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1985); MD. FAm. LAW. CODE ANN. § 5-327(a) (1984) (permitting receipt of medical
and legal expenses); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § IIA (West Supp. 1985);
Mici. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(1) (West Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt of court
approved fees); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAWS § 374(6) (McKinney 1977) (permitting receipt

of medical expenses); N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 48-37 (1984); Omo REv.

CODE ANN.

§

3107.10 (Page 1980) (noting that the prohibition does not apply to adoption by a
stepparent, and that the mother can receive payment for medical and legal expenses);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 866 (West Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt of medical and
legal expenses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); TENN. CODE. ANN. §
36-1-135(a) (1984) (permitting receipt of medical and legal expenses); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-203 (1979) (allowing receipt of actual, reasonable medical, hospital,
and confinement expenses); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.716(1)(a) (West 1982) (permitting
hospital, medical, and legal expenses); see also CAL. PEN. CODE § 273 (West 1970)
(prohibiting payments in excess of medical expenses to the mother or agency); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-418(b) (Harrison Supp. 1984) (prohibiting payments in excess of
medical expenses); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1702 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (prohibiting
payments to mother or agency). 39 VAND. L. REv. at 639 n.189.
33. Note, Human Reproductive Technologies: An Appeal for Brave New
Legislation in a Brave New World, 25 WAsHauRN L.J. 458, 490-91 n.203 (1986).

See

§

§

ALA. CODE
26-10-8 (1975); Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
8-126(c) (1974); FLA.
STAT. § 63.212(1)(d) (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(b) (1982) (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-418(b) (1982)); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.286(a)
(West Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-

§

203 (1978).
34. 39

VAND. L. REv. at 639-40. Cf., e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-4-115
(1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (1981) (attorney's fees, court costs, and a
service fee can be received); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1526, 1701 (Smith-Hurd
1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985) (allowing receipt of attorney's
fees, medical expenses, reasonable charges by a licensed agency, and other court-
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The primary purposes and goals underlying these statutes are
twofold. First, and most important, is that statutes relating to custody
and adoption are designed to promote the best interests of the child."
Second, statutes regulating the process of legal adoption are intended
6
to prevent child-bartering or baby selling.
Under the unique circumstances of the surrogate parenting agreement, it is clear that the best interests of the child are being promoted.
The adopting couple has planned extensively for the child.17 In fact,
the couple has done everything in their power to obtain the child.
Additionally, the adopting father is typically also the biological father
of the child. "[M]any state legislatures hold the view that the best
interests of the child are promoted just as much by permitting the
child to live with the natural father as by permitting the child to live
with the natural mother.""8

appointed charges); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1985)
(allowing licensed placement agencies to charge a fee for placement); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8204(3) (1980) (allowing receipt of reasonable costs for services);
MD. FA . LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327 (1984) (allowing receipt of medical and legal
expenses); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § IIA (West Supp. 1985); MicI. CoMe.
LAWS ANN. § 710.54(1) (West Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt of court-approved fees);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 127.285, .290 (1981) (attorneys and licensed agencies can receive
reasonable compensation); N.J. STAT. Am. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1985) (permitting
receipt of medical expenses, birth-related expenses, and fees charged by a licensed
agency); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1977) (permitting receipt of
medical expenses); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.10
(Page 1980) (permitting medical and legal expenses and exempting step-parents from
prohibition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt
of medical and legal expenses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984)
(permitting receipt of court-approved fees and licensed agency's fees); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-1-135(a) (1984) (permitting receipt of medical and legal expenses); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 55-8a-l (Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt of medical and legal expenses);
W.VA. CODE § 48-4-5(e) (Supp. 1985) (limiting fees to value of services rendered);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 946.716(1)(b) (West 1982) (only licensed agencies); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 63.097, 63.212(l)(g) (West 1985) (allowing agencies to receive compensation, but requiring court approval for more than $500 over the actual documented medical and legal expenses); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West 1981) (allowing
a receipt of a reasonable fee). 39 VAND. L. REv. at 639-40 n.190.
35. 39 VAND. L. REv. at 641.
36. Id. at 641 n.195. "Child-bartering (or baby selling) is the selling of
children for a fee or for some other item of value." Id.
37. Id. at 642.
38. Id. at 642-43. For custody statute providing that the state shall not prefer
one parent over the other, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (1983); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-718 (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(b) (1981); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-11 (Burns Supp.
1985); MD. F

m. LAW CODE ANN.

(West 1982); Mo. ANN.

STAT.

§ 5-203(c)(2) (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 453.110 (Vernon 1977); N.D.

§

CENT. CODE

257.025

§ 14-09-
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It is equally clear that surrogate mothering agreements do not
contravene a state's interest in preventing baby selling. The blackmarket evils which baby selling statutes seek to prevent are not
present in the surrogate parenting agreement. 39 A typical black-market
adoption involves a third party who arranges for a married couple
to adopt an unwed mother's baby. 40 An important characteristic
present in surrogate mothering agreements which is absent in the
case of black-market adoptions, is that the surrogate has agreed to
41
relinquish her parental rights prior to the conception of the child.
"By its nature the surrogate mother's relinquishment of the child is
completely voluntary since the contractual arrangements are made in
42
the absence of pressure" before the surrogate becomes pregnant.
Finally, the money received by the surrogate mother is not payment
for the child, but rather for the services she performs. 43 The surrogate
is being reimbursed for the physical acts of pregnancy and childbirth." When viewed in this light, it is clear that state statutes
prohibiting baby selling should not be interpreted to forbid the
surrogate mother arrangement. 45
III.

EXISTING STATE JUDIcIAL DECISIONS

Very few cases have been reported in which a state .court was
called upon to interpret the enforceability and legality of surrogate

05 (Supp. 1983); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.03 (Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.030 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1002 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-5-10 (1984); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1975); Wis.
STAT.

GA.

ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1981). But see

CODE ANN.

CAL.

CIV.

CODE

§ 197 (West 1982);

§ 74-203 (Harrison Supp. 1984) (mother is entitled to custody of

illegitimate child unless the father legitimizes him, then custody is based on best
interests of child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-953 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.435 (West Supp. 1985).
39. 7 Am. J. LAW & MED. at 330.

40. 39 VAND. L. REV. at 642. Unlike surrogate motherhood, the intermediary
in a black-market adoption rarely investigates the mental and physical health of the
involved parties. Id.
41. Id. The typical black-market adoption involves a rather young, unwed
mother who suffers both personal and societal pressure to relinquish the baby for
adoption. Id. at 641.
42. 7 AM. J. LAW & MED. at 331.
43. Id. at 331. See also Erickson, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 611 (1978). "Because the purchaser is the natural father of the child, the risk
that hard 'commercial' considerations will prevail over the interests of the child or
the mother is slight." Id. at 613.
44.

7 Am. J. LAW &

45.

Id.

MED.

at 331.
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parenting agreements. This is not to be misconstrued, however, as
implying that surrogate motherhood is not a frequent occurrence. In
fact, it has been estimated that there have been hundreds of surrogate
births in the United States. 46 Presently, there are approximately thirty
centers throughout the United States which perform the services of
47
matching prospective surrogates with childless couples.
A thorough analysis of the few existing court cases will exhibit the
rising need for legislation in this area. Of these cases, none have
come to a conclusion consistent with the others. As more people
consider the possibility of surrogate motherhood, and the practice
becomes more prevalent, litigation will certainly increase, and a
"chaotic patchwork of judicial decisions will result." 4
The first reported case involving surrogate motherhood was Doe
v. Kelley.4 9 In this case, a married couple entered into a surrogate
parenting agreement whereby the surrogate agreed to conceive a child
by means of artificial insemination and thereafter consent to the
adoption of the child.50 In return for her services, the surrogate was
to receive the sum of $5,000 plus medical expenses." In an action
against the State Attorney General,5 2 the parties to the surrogate
agreement sought to have certain statutes prohibiting the exchange
of money in connection with adoption declared unconstitutional.53

46. Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J. LAW & MED.
243 (1984). See Keane & Breo, The Surrogate Mother 12 (1981) ("By the end of
1981, there will be about a hundred children born to surrogate mothers and adopted
by others."); Smith, The Perils and Peregrinationsof Surrogate Mothers, 1 MED.
& L. 325 (1982) ("It is thought that several hundred women are currently, or have
been, fulfilling roles a surrogate mothers.").
47. Cohen, 10 AM. J. LAW & MED. at 243-44.
48. 8 J. LEG. 140 (1981). See also Bird, supra 2 CALnF. LAWYER 21 (1982).
49. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
50. Id. at 170, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
51. Id. In addition, the parties agreed that the surrogate would be covered
by sick leave, pregnancy disability insurance, and medical insurance for the time
she was off work due to the pregnancy and delivery. Id.
52. Id. at 169, 307 N.W.2d at 438. The Wayne County Prosecutors Office
was also a party to the action. Id.
53. Id. at 170, 307 N.W.2d at 439. The statutes sought to be declared
unconstitutional were sections of the Michigan Adoption Code, MICH. CoMp. LAWS.
§ 710.54; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.54) and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 710.69;
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.69). These statutory provisions state:
Sec. 54. (1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall
not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value
in connection with any of the following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption.
(b) The registration, recording or communication of the existence of a
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On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals from an order denying
summary judgment,5 4 the Michigan court held that the statutes did
not prohibit the parties from having a child through the surrogate
parenting agreement.5 5 Rather, the statutes prohibited payment to a
surrogate in connection with her consent to adoption of the child by
56
the sperm donor and his wife.
Two years later, the Michigan Court of Appeals was again confronted with the legality of surrogate parenting agreements. In Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 7 the biological father of a child conceived

child available for adoption or the existence of a person interested in
adopting a child.
(c) A release.
(d) A consent.

(e) A petition.
(2) Before the entry of the final order of adoption, the petitioner shall file
with the court a sworn statement describing money or other consideration or
thing of value paid to or exchanged by any party in the adoption proceeding,
including anyone consenting to the adoption or adopting the adoptee, any
relative of a party or of the adoptee, any physician, attorney, social worker
or member of the clergy, and any other person, corporation, association, or
other organization. The court shall approve or disapprove fees and expenses.
Acceptance or retention of amounts in excess of those approved by the court
constitutes a violation of this section.
(3) To assure compliance with limitations imposed by this section, by section
14 of Act No. 116 of the Public Acts of 1973, being section 722.124 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws, and by section 4 of Act No. 263 of the Public
Acts of 1913, as amended, being section 331.404 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws, the court may require sworn testimony from persons who were involved
in any way in informing, notifying, exchanging information, identifying,
locating, assisting, or in any other way participating in the contracts or
arrangements which, directly or indirectly, led to placement of the person for
adoption.
Sec. 69. A person who violates any of the provisions of section 41 and 54 of this
chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon subsequent
conviction shall be guilty of a felony.
54. 106 Mich. App. at 170, 307 N.W.2d at 439. The Circuit Court, Wayne
County, Michigan, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted
summary judgment for the defendants. Id.
55. Id. at 171, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
56. Id. The court stated:
The statute in question does not directly prohibit John Doe [the sperm donor]
and Mary Roe [the surrogate] from having the child as planned. It acts instead
to preclude plaintiffs from paying consideration in conjunction with their use
of the state's adoption procedures. In effect, the plaintiffs contractual agreement discloses a desire to use the adoption code to change the legal status of
the child, i.e., its right to support, intestate succession, etc.
Id.

57.

122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983).
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through a surrogate parenting agreement" filed a notice of intent to
claim paternity5 9 and a petition seeking an order of filiation. 6 0 The
Michigan Attorney General thereafter filed a notice of intervention,
alleging that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the action
pursuant to The Paternity Act as the action involved a surrogate
motherhood arrangement. 6' Specifically, the Attorney General argued
that the surrogate's husband was the legal father of the child because
he consented to the artificial insemination. 62 Refusing to reach the
issue of whether surrogate mother contracts were against public
policy, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the relief
requested was beyond the scope of The Paternity Act and thus not
6
within the court's jurisdiction.

58. 333 N.W.2d at 90. Under this surrogate agreement, Corinne Appleyard
agreed to be artificially inseminiated with George Syrkowski's sperm. Upon birth
of the child, the agreement specified that Syrkowski would obtain custody of the
child and Appleyard would receive $10,000 plus medical expenses. Id. at 90-91 n.1.
59. Id. at 91. Syrkowski filed a notice of intent to claim paternity pursuant
to § 33 of the Michigan Adoption Code, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 710.33; MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178(555.33). 333 N.W. 2d at 91.
60. 333 N.W.2d at 91. Syrkowski requested an order of filiation pursuant to
§ 7(a) of The Paternity Act, MICH. Comp LAWS. § 722.717(a); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.497(a), and entry of his name as the natural father on the child's birth
certificate. 333 N.W.2d at 91.
An order of filiation is defined as an order by a court or judge having
jurisdiction, fixing the paternity of a bastard child upon a given man, and requiring
him to provide for the support of said child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (5th
ed. 1979).
The proposed consent order of filiation stated that the best interests of the
child would be served by the circuit court's determination that Syrkowski was the
natural and legal father of the child and therefore award him full custody of the
child. 333 N.W. 2d at 91.
61. 333 N.W. 2d at 92. The preamble to The Paternity Act, MICH. CoM,.
LAWS § 722.711 et seq.; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.491 et seq., provides:
AN ACT to confer upon circuit courts jurisdiction over proceedings to compel
and provide support of children born out of wedlock; to prescribe the
procedure for determination of such liability; to authorize agreements providing
for furnishing of such support and to provide for the enforcement thereof;
and to prescribe penalties for the violation of certain provisions of this act.
333 N.W.2d at 93.
62. 333 N.W.2d at 92. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 14.15(2824)(6) which provides: "A child born to a married woman as the
result of artificial insemination, with consent of her husband, is considered to be
the legitimate child of the husband and wife." Id. Contrary to the Attorney General's
contention, the surrogate's husband did not consent to the artificial insemination.
Id. In fact, in a statement of nonconsent, the surrogate's husband declared: "I
expressly revoke and withhold my consent for any artificial insemination of my wife
in connection with the surrogate arrangement and recognize that by doing so I
cannot be declared or considered to be the legal father of said child." Id.
63. 333 N.W.2d at 93-94. The court noted:
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The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the decision of the
Michigan Court of Appeals, finding that the circuit court would have
jurisdiction over a biological father's Paternity Act request for an
order of filiation when the biological mother and father have entered
into a surrogate parenting agreement. 64 The Michigan Supreme Court
recognized that the purpose of The Paternity Act is to provide for
children born out of wedlock. 65 Such children include not only those
born to an unmarried woman, but also children which the court
determines to be born during marriage but not the issue of that
marriage. 66
Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that if a
child is born or conceived during a marriage, both spouses are
presumed to be the natural parents of the child.6 7 Moreover, a child

born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination, with
the consent of her husband, is considered to be the legitimate child
of both the wife and the husband.6 "Consent of the husband is
presumed unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing
evidence. ' 69 Both of the statutes relied upon by the Attorney General
make the husband's consent to the artificial insemination a prerequisite to application of this presumption. "In other words, it is a
rebuttable presumption. ' ' 70 Under the circumstances, it is clear that
the surrogate's husband unequivocally rebutted the presumption of
paternity, 71 thereby placing the child within the meaning of "a child

We view the surrogate mother arrangements with caution as we approach an
unexplored area in the law which, without a doubt, can have a profound
effect on the lives of our people. The courts should not be called upon to
enlarge the scope of The Paternity Act to encompass circumstances never
contemplated thereby. Studied legislation is needed before surrogate arrangements are recognized as proposed under the facts submitted herein.
Id. at 94.
64. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
65. 362 N.W.2d at 214.
66. Id. Previously, the Act's definition of a "child born out of wedlock"
was limited to children born to an unmarried woman. Id. The present definition
provides, however, that a "child born out of wedlock" means "a child begotten
and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of
birth of the child, or a child which the court has determined to be a child born
during the marriage but not the issue of that marriage." Id. See MiCH. Comp. LAWS
§ 722.711(a); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.491(a).
67. 362 N.W.2d at 213 (citing Michigan Revised Probate Code, 1978 P.A.
642; MICH. Comp. LAWS § 700.1 et seq.; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5001 et seq.
68. 362 N.W.2d at'212. See note 62 and accompanying text.
69. 362 N.W.2d at 213.
70. Id.
71. See note 62 and accompanying text.
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born out of wedlock", and thus, under the jurisdiction of The
Paternity Act. 2
Michigan is not the only state to have decided issues surrounding
surrogate motherhood. In Kentucky, parties to surrogate arrangements have met with several levels of opposition. The Kentucky
Attorney General issued an opinion in 1981 concluding that surrogate
contracts violated Kentucky statutes which prohibit payment in connection with adoption. 73 Three years later, a Kentucky trial court
held that fee arrangements for the relinquishment of parental rights
were not prohibited under the statute. 74 Later that same year, however, another Kentucky trial court denied a motion by a surrogate
and her husband to terminate their parental rights, holding that
evidence of the surrogate's marriage created a conclusive presumption
that he was the child's legal father. 75
The issue of the legality of surrogate agreements eventually reached
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Surrogate Parenting Associates v.
Kentucky. 76 The Kentucky Attorney General instituted proceedings
against Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. [hereinafter SPA] seeking to revoke the corporation's charter on the grounds of abuse and
77
misuse of corporate powers detrimental to the welfare of the state.
SPA operates a medical clinic whereby it assists infertile couples in
obtaining children through the artificial insemination of a surrogate
mother .7
72. 362 N.W.2d at 214.
73. See Surrogate Motherhood Contracts Declared Illegal by Kentucky A.G.,
7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2246 (1981).

74. See Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
1105 (1983).
75. See In re Baby Girl, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2348 (1983). The trial court
determined that since the mother was married and had been in contact with her
husband during the possible time of conception, the presumption was deemed
conclusive and could not be overcome merely by an affidavit admitting to artificial
insemination. Id.
76. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
77. Id. at 210. The Kentucky Attorney General alleged that SPA's surrogate
parenting procedure is in violation of several Kentucky statutes. The relevant statutes
are as follows: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) prohibits the sale, purchase or
procurement for sale or purchase of any child for the purpose of adoption; KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.601(2) prohibits the filing of a petition for the voluntary
termination of parental rights prior to five days after the birth of the child; and
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) which specifies that a consent for an adoption
shall not be held to be valid if such consent is given prior to the fifth day after the
birth of the child. 704 S.W.2d at 210.
78. 704 S.W.2d at 211. SPA and its president are paid a fee by the biological
father for the selection and artificial insemination of the surrogate. SPA also receives
an additional fee for obstetrical care and testing of the surrogate mother during
pregnancy as well as for the actual delivery of the child. Id.
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The Kentucky Supreme Court focused on interpreting the statutory
language to determine if SPA's involvement in surrogate parenting
procedures should be construed as participating in the buying and
selling of babies.7 9 In a five to two decision, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that, "there are fundamental differences between the
surrogate parenting procedure in which SPA participates and the
buying and selling of children," and therefore, the procedures employed are beyond the purview of present legislation.80
By its decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court has taken the position

that custody contracts, such as surrogate parenting agreements, are
voidable, not illegal and void."' Therefore, the surrogate mother who
decides to retain custody of the child rather than follow through
with her contractual obligations stands in the same legal position as
a woman who conceives without the benefit of a contract.8 2 By
breaching the contract, the surrogate has forfeited her rights to any
payment.83 Moreover, upon breach, the mother, child, and biological
father retain all statutory rights and obligations which exist in the
4
absence of a contract.
Circumstances similar to those in Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc. v. Kentucky arose in New York with the case of In re Adoption
of Baby Girl, L.J.85 In determining that statutes which prohibit the
payment or acceptance of compensation in connection with the

79. Id.
80. Id. The court noted that:
[Tihe central fact in the surrogate parenting procedure is that the agreement
is entered into before conception. The essential considerations for the surrogate
mother when she agrees to the surrogate parenting procedure are not avoiding
the consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear of the financial burden
of child rearing. On the contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a
person or couple who desperately want a child but are unable to conceive one
in the customary manner to achieve a biologically- related offspring. (emphasis
in original).
Id. at 211-12.
81. Id. at 213.
Indeed, we have no reason to believe that the surrogate parenting procedure
in which SPA participates will not, in most instances, proceed routinely to
the conclusion desired by all of the parties at the outset-a woman who can
bear children assisting a childless couple to fulfill their desire for a biologicallyrelated child.
Id. at 213-14.
82. Id. at 213.
83. Id.
84. Id. The term "biological father" refers to the sperm donor, not the
surrogate's husband.
85. 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. 1986).

19881

SURROGATE PARENTING

647

placing of a child for adoption are inapplicable to surrogate agreements, the New York Surrogate's Court noted that biomedical science
has advanced man into a new era of genetics which was not contemplated by the legislature when enacting statutes prohibiting payments
in connection with an adoption. "Accordingly, the court finds that
this is a matter for the legislature to address rather than for the
judiciary to attempt to determine by the impermissible means of
'judicial' legislation." 8 7 The most recent, and probably most controversial, case concerning surrogate parenting agreements is In re
Baby M.88 Though the facts in Baby M. are particularly interesting,
they are much too lengthy to be reproduced here. Therefore, discussion will be limited to the New Jersey Superior Court's analysis
which is based primarily on contract law.
At the outset, the court concluded that adoption statutes would
89
not be used to either accomodate or deny surrogacy contracts.
"[T]here is no law governing surrogacy contracts in New Jersey and
the laws of adoption do not apply." ' 9 Furthermore, surrogate contracts are not contrary to public policy as New Jersey has no stated
public policy against surrogacy. 91
The New Jersey Superior Court focused its analysis on whether
the surrogate agreement constituted a valid, enforceable contract. 92
The parties to the surrogate agreement had expressed their respective
offers and acceptances to each other and had reduced their under-

86. Id. at 817. "Current legislation does not expressly foreclose the use of
surrogate mothers or the paying of compensation to them under parenting agreements." Id. at 818.
87. Id. at 818. In the absence of legislation, the court will not prohibit
surrogate parenting contracts. Id.
88. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987).
89. Id. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159.

90. Id. "Use of laws not intended for their intended purpose creates forced
and confusing results." Id. at 374-75, 525 A.2d at 1159. The court further noted
that the adopting wife is not a party to the surrogate contract and thus, the contract
does not violate the state statute prohibiting the giving of consideration to obtain
an adoptable child. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(a) which provides:
No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall make,
offer to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in
connection therewith,
(1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or any valuable consideration, or
assume or discharge any financial obligation; or
(2) Take, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or valuable consideration.
91. 217 N.J. Super. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166.
92.

Id.
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standing to writing. 93 Even if their mutual promises were insufficient
to constitute valid consideration, consideration certainly existed once
there was. conception. 94 "The male gave his sperm; the female gave
her egg in the pre-planned effort to create a child, thus a contract." 95
Once the court determined that the surrogacy arrangement was
indeed a contract, it was necessary to discuss the applicability of
defenses which could potentially render the contract unenforceable.
The defenses specifically addressed by the court included contracts
of adhesion and illusory contracts. By definition, "a contract of
adhesion is one in which one party has no alternative but to accept
or reject the other party's terms and there are no options by which
the party may obtain the product or the service.''96 Under the
circumstances of a surrogate contract, neither party has a superior
bargaining position. Each has what the other wants. 97 Furthermore,
because neither party has disproportionate bargaining power, there
is no problem of unconscionability. 9 Clearly, the contract at issue
was not a contract of adhesion.
Similarly, the contract was not illusory. 99 An illusory contract is
one in which only one of the parties has an obligation which benefits
the other.'°° Mutuality of obligation, however, does not mean equality
of obligation. The mere fact that the adopting couple may refuse to
accept the child does not alleviate their obligation to support that
child.' 0 1
As none of the foregoing defenses were applicable to the surrogacy
contract under the circumstances, the court then turned its discussion
to the remedies available for the breach of the agreement. Although
a contract is valid from the time it is signed, the surrogate mother
may nevertheless renounce and terminate the contract up until the
time of conception.' °2 If a breach occurs at this time, the surrogate

93. Id. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1158.
94. Id.
95. Id. "The child was conceived with a mutual understanding by the parties
of her (the child's) future life." Id.
96. Id. at 376, 525 A.2d at 1159.
97. Id. In fact, the surrogate may be in a better position than the adopting
couple as she is the one who is able to have the child that the adopting couple
desperately wants but cannot have without the surrogate's cooperation.
98. Id. at 377, 525 A.2d at 1160.
99. Id. at 384, 525 A.2d at 1163.
100. Id. An illusory contract does not contain mutuality of obligation. Id.
101. Id. The biological father may be responsible for the support of the child
even if custody is refused due to some physical defect. Id.
102. Id. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159.
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would relinquish all payments made to her under the contract and
may be liable for monetary damages.103 Once conception has occurred, however, the rights of the parties are fixed, the terms of the
contract set, and performance anticipated.' 04 Under these circumstances, monetary damages are probably insufficient.
The remedies which exist for an ordinary breach of contract include
either an award of monetary damages or specific performance of the
terms of the contract.' 05 Monetary damages cannot possibly compensate the adopting couple for the loss of a child.' ° Under the unique
circumstances of the surrogate contract, specific performance, or the
surrogate's forced relinquishment of the child, may be ordered by
the court, but only if doing so would be in the best interest of the
child.1w In the case of Baby M. the New Jersey Superior Court
found that the best interests of the child would be served by compelling the delivery of the child to the adopting couple. 10 Specifically
enforcing the contract will automatically sever and terminate all
parental rights of the surrogate.'0 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted direct certification"10 and
subsequently reversed the decision of the trial court."' In a unanimous
decision," 2 the court invalidated the surrogacy contract because they
found that it conflicted with the law and public policy of the State
of New Jersey." 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted, however,

103.
and birth
104.
105.
106.
107.
aspect of

Id. "Specific performance to compel a promised conception, gestation,
shall not be available to the male promisor." Id.
Id.
Id. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166. "[Tlhe child's best interest is the only
man's law that must be applied in fashioning a remedy for this contract

. . . for any contract that deals with the children of our society. . .

."

Id. Addi-

tionally, the court noted that since they are dealing with a human life, "the most
precious and unique thing on this earth, a small vulnerable and lovable child," any
order for specific performance must be determined to be in the best interest of the
child. Id.
108. Id. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1170-81.
109. Id. at 399, 525 A.2d at 1171. As the court noted, "termination of
parental rights is an extraordinary judicial remedy which is to be granted only after
intensive consideration of parental conduct and the needs of the child. Judicial
caution in granting termination arises from the permanent and irreversible nature
of the order." Id.
110. 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (1987).
111. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 1 (1988).
112. The opinion of the court was rendered by Chief Justice Wilentz, joined
by Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stern.
113. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 5. "While we recognize
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that their decision did "not preclude the legislature from altering the
statutory scheme within constitutional limits, so as to permit surrogacy contracts.""14 In its opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court

agreed substantially with the superior court's analysis and conclusions
concerning the custody of the infant,"' however, it found that the
surrogacy contract was invalid since it not only conflicted directly
with existing statutes, including those concerning adoption, termination of parental rights, and payment of money in connection with
adoption, but it also conflicted with the public policies of New
Jersey. 116

Initially, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the surrogacy
contract violative of laws prohibiting the payment of money in
connection with adoptions."' Despite the contention that the money
was paid solely for the services of pregnancy and childbirth, and not
to facilitate an adoption, the court noted that no money would be
exchanged should the child die prior to the fourth month of pregnancy, and only $1,000 would be paid if the child were stillborn,
"even though the 'services' had been fully rendered." ' 8 "This is the
sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother's right to
her child . . ., [a]lmost every evil that prompted the prohibition of
the payment of money in connection with adoptions exists here.""19
the depth of the yearning of infertile couples to have their own children, we find
the payment of money to a 'surrogate' mother illegal, perhaps criminal, and
potentially degrading to women." Id.
114. Id. at 6.
115.

Id. at 18.

116. Id.at 23-24.
Although in this case we grant custody to the natural father, the evidence
having clearly proved such custody to be in the best interests of the infant,
we void both the termination of the surrogate mother's parental rights and
the adoption of the child by the wife/stepparent. We thus restore the 'surrogate' as the mother of the child.
Id. at 5-6.
117. Id. at 25. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(a) which prohibits the paying or
accepting of money in connection with any placement of a child for adoption.
The prohibition of subsection (a) shall not apply to the fees or services of
any approved agency in connection with a placement for adoption, nor shall
such prohibition apply to the payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital
or other similar expenses incurred in connection with the birth or any illness
of the child, or to the acceptance of such reimbursement by a parent of the
child.
Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 26 n.4 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-54(b)).
118. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 28.
119. Id. at 52. "The negative consequences of baby buying are potentially
present in the surrogacy context, especially the potential for placing and adopting a
child without regard to the interest of the child or the natural mother." Id. at 30.
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Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the surrogacy contract violated laws which required proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is
ordered or an adoption is granted. 20 New Jersey laws provide for
the termination of parental rights only where there has been a
voluntary surrender of a child to an approved agency,' 2 ' or to the
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), 22 or in a private
placement adoption, where there has been a showing of parental
abandonment or unfitness. 2 Therefore, in order to terminate parental rights in the instant case, a private placement adoption, there
must be a showing of "intentional abandonment or a very substantial
neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a
reversal of that conduct in the future."' 24 It therefore becomes
apparent that "a contratual agreement to abandon one's parental
rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced
by our courts.'

1

25

Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the surrogacy
contract violated the law that makes the surrender of custody and
consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions. 126 As
noted previously, a natural mother's consent to surrender her child
and to its subsequent adoption is not required in private placement
adoptions; rather, all that need be shown is parental abandonment
or unfitness.' 27 "[I]n an unsupervised private placement, since there

120. Id.
121. Id. at 31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-18 et seq. governs an action by an
approved agency to terminate parental rights. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States
library, N.J. file at 31.
122. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 32. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4C-23 governs where DYFS is the agency seeking termination. Feb. 3, 1988,
on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 32.
123. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 33. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-48(c)(1) governs the termination of parental rights in private placement adoptions. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 33.
124. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 33 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-48(c)(1)). See also Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977),
wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that in an unregulated private
placement, "neither consent nor voluntary surrender is singled out as a statutory
factor in terminating parental rights." Id. at 213, 377 A.2d at 634.
125. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 37. "The legislature
would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termination to be achieved by
one short sentence in a contract." Id.
126. Id. at 37-38.
127. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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is no statutory obligation to consent, there can be no legal barrier
to its retraction. ' 121 Thus, there can be no doubt that a contractual
provision purporting to constitute an irrevocable agreement to sur129
render custody of a child for adoption is invalid.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also found the surrogacy contract
to violate numerous aspects of the state's public policy.1 30 Such a
contract guarantees permanent separation of a child from one of its
natural parents in contravention of New Jersey's policy, that whenever possible, a child should remain with both parents.1 3 1 Moreover,
"[tihe surrogacy contract violates the policy of the state that the
rights of natural parents are equal concerning their child, the father's
' 32
right no greater than the mother's."'
In concluding, the court recognized that the long-term effects of
surrogacy are not known, but feared. 3 3 "[Tlhe harmful consequences
of this surrogacy arrangement appear to us all too palpable. In New
Jersey the surrogate mother's agreement to sell her child is void. Its
irrevocability infects the entire contract, as does the money that
' 34
purports to buy it.' 1
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The unique circumstances of surrogate parenting, the inapplicability
of existing statutes, and the inconsistencies in judicial decisions, all
point to the conclusion that legislation is desperately needed in the
area of surrogate motherhood. State legislatures have generally failed
to address the unresolved legal problems which arise in surrogate
parenting agreements. 35 Some of the many issues which need to be
128. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 45.
129. Id.at 43-44.
130. Id.at 46.
131. Id.at 47.
132. Id. at 48. "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every
child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id. at
48-49 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40).
133. Feb. 3, 1988, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file at 57.
134. Id.at 59.
135. As of 1984, surveys of the National Committee for Adoption found
legislative activity related to surrogate parenting in twenty-one (21) states and the
District of Columbia. Discussions on Alabama, District of Columbia, Kentucky,
and Oklahoma were centered on prohibiting surrogate parenting. Missouri and Ohio
had considered similar prohibitions, but took a neutral stance. In fifteen (15) states,
however, activity focused on allowing surrogate agreements. These states included:
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Virginia. The Committee for Adoption concluded that Michigan is the only state
with strong advocates, legislatively and otherwise, on both sides of the issue. See
Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 3001, 3003 (1985).
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resolved through legislation include, but are not limited to: (1) the
rights of all the parties involved, including the spouses of the biological mother and biological father; (2) the legitimacy of the child;
(3) the allowance of compensation; (4) the duties of the parents
regarding the imperfect child, specifically amniocentesis and abortion;
and, (5) the remedies available for a breach of contract.
As of 1986, Arkansas is the only state that has a statute designed
specifically to regulate surrogate parenting.1 6 Stated simply, the
Arkansas statute provides that a child born to an unmarried surrogate
mother is the child of the intended parents. 3 7 Even this statute,
however, does not adequately deal with all of the problems inherent
in surrogate parenting since it only applies to arrangements involving
38
an unmarried surrogate mother.
On March 2, 1987 and March 10, 1987, two bills were introduced
in the General Assembly of Pennsylvania to specifically govern the
practice of surrogate parenting.3 9 The first bill' 40 would amend an
already existing statute which prohibits dealing in humanity by trading, bartering, buying, selling, or dealing in infant children.14 ' Specifically, this bill proposes to make the participation in a verbal or

136.

See ARK.

STAT.

ANN. § 34-720-21 (Supp. 1985).

CHILD BORN AS RESULT OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION SHALL BE DEEMED LEGITIMATE

NATURAL CHILD OF HUSBAND.

Any child born to a married woman by means

of artificial insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the
woman's husband if the husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination.
CHILD BORN TO MARRIED OR UNMARRIED WOMAN - PRESUMPTIONS - SURROGATE
MOTHERS. (A) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a woman

who is married at the time of the birth of such child, shall be presumed to
be the child of the woman's husband.
(B) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a woman who is
unmarried at the time of the birth of the child, shall be for all legal purposes
the child of the woman giving birth, except in the case of a surrogate mother,
in which event the child shall be that of the woman intended to be the mother.
For birth registration purposes, in cases of surrogate mothers, the woman
giving birth shall be presumed to be the natural mother and shall be listed as
such on the certificate of birth, but a substituted certificate of birth can be
issued upon orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
137. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-721(B) (Supp. 1985).

138.

Id.

139. See H.R. 570, 171st Sess. (1987); H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987).
140. H.R. 570, 171st Sess. (1987). This bill proposes an amendment to Title
18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, prohibiting
surrogate mothering.
141. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4305 (1983) provides: "A person is guilty of
a misdemeanor of the first degree if he deals in humanity, by trading, bartering,
buying, selling, or dealing in infant children."
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written agreement relating to the practice of surrogate mothering, a
42

misdemeanor of the first degree.1
44
The second bill,' 43 rather than prohibiting surrogate mothering,'
purports to regulate the practice by adopting a statute specifically
written for that purpose. 45 The bill recognizes the increase in the
practice of surrogate parenting brought about by the increased incidence of female infertility.'" Moreover, the proponents of this bill
acknowledge that the legal status of children born under surrogate
parenting arrangements is currently uncertain, and therefore propose
that the General Assembly act to protect the best interests of the
children who will result from the practice of surrogate parenting. 47

142. H.R. 570, 171st Sess. (1987). As amended, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4305(b) would provide:
As used in this section the term "surrogate mothering" means doing any of
the following for the purpose of receiving financial compensation for providing
a couple or single person with a child:
(1) Becoming pregnant.
(2) Completing the gestation cycle of that pregnancy.
(3) Delivering the child of that pregnancy.
(4) Conspiring with or enticing another to become preganant, complete gestation, and deliver the child of that pregnancy.
143. H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987).
144. Id. The proponents of this bill recognize that an individual's decision
regarding whether or not to bear or beget a child falls within the constitutionally
protected right of privacy. "[T]herefore, the Commonwealth may not prohibit the
practice of surrogate parenting or enact regulations that would have the effect of
prohibiting the practice." Id.
145. H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987) seeks to amend Title 23 (Domestic Relations)
of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, to provide for surrogate parenting.
146. Id. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recognized that "due to the increased incidence of female infertility, many couples are
turning to surrogate mothers to help them create families." Id. Approximately
fifteen to twenty percent of American couples of childbearing age are infertile.
Cohen, 10 AM. J. LAW & MED. at.243-44. "Due to the availability of birth control
and abortion, the lessened fertility apparently caused by environmental pollutants,
venereal disease, and certain forms of contraception such as intrauterine devices, as
well as to the lessening social stigma that faces today's unwed mothers, there simply
are not enough healthy, adoptable babies to meet the demand. . .

."

Bird, 2

CALIF.

21, 22 (Feb. 1982). Therefore, because of this decrease in the number of
available adoptable babies, many couples are turning to the alternative of surrogate
motherhood. Cohen, supra at 244.
147. H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987). As amended, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3001 would be entirely a definitional section. Under this section, the term "surrogate
parent agreement" is defined as:
A written contract entered into by the intended parents and a surrogate
mother, which conforms to the requirements of section 3004 (relating to
surrogate parenting agreements), whereby the surrogate mother agrees to be
inseminated by the sperm of the husband of an infertile woman and to carry
LAWYER
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The necessary provisions of the surrogate parenting agreement are
set forth at length in the proposed bill. More important, however,
are the provisions which give the surrogate mother control over the
medical decisions relating to her pregnancy 148 and limit the remedies
available for breach of contract to money damages. 149 Moreover, the
proposed bill would enable the surrogate mother to revoke her
consent to relinquish custody of the child if done within twenty days
of the birth of the child. 50
V.

CONCLUSION

The surrogate parenting procedure may provide a childless couple
with its only means of obtaining a child biologically related to at
least one of the parents. Because of the lack of surrogate parenting
statutes, however, and the uncertain applicability of existing statutes,
the enforceability of such surrogate agreements remains unpredicta-

the child to term, or consents to carry to term the embryo/zygote produced
by the intended parents through the process of in vitro fertilization, and
consents to the surrender of the child to the intended parents upon the birth
of the child as soon thereafter is as medically feasible.
In order to be enforceable, the surrogate agreement must be judicially approved.
See H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987) (proposed 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3003). "A

person who enters into a surrogate parenting agreement and pays fees under that
agreement without court approval .

.

. commits a misdemeanor of the third degree

and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $2,000 or to imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both." See H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987) (proposed
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3009).
148. H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987). As amended, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3004(a)(4) would provide "that the surrogate mother will have control of medical
decisions relating to her preganancy." This section would enable the surrogate to
decide for herself whether to abort, or refrain from aborting, should it be discovered
that the child will be born with a physical or mental defect.
149. H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987). As amended, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3004(a)(1 1) would provide that "a cause of action arising from a surrogate parenting
agreement be limited to an action for breach of contract and an action for
enforcement of the terms of the agreement and that remedies for breach of contract
be limited to money damages in the amount described in the agreement." This
section would therefore eliminate the remedy of specific performance.
150. H.R. 776, 171st Sess. (1987). As amended, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3008 would provide:
A surrogate mother may revoke her consent to relinquish custody of the child
of the intended parents. Revocation under this section must:
(1) be made in writing;
(2) be filed with the court that approved the surrogate parenting agreement;
(3) be given to the intended parents;
(4) be made within 20 days of the birth of the child; and
(5) comply with the surrogate parenting agreement.
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ble. In order to obtain stability in the law, therefore, legislation
should be adopted. Such legislation would enable the parties to
become fully informed of their rights prior to entering into a surrogate agreement. Furthermore, legislation would ensure that the best
interests of the child are being met at all times.
Surrogate motherhood is not a fad. The problems inherent in the
procedure will not go away. In fact, as more couples proceed to
enter into these agreements, litigation will only increase. Therefore,
the time for appropriate legislation has arrived.
Joanna K. Budde

